INTERNATIONAL ANALYST NETWORK: There are two critical lessons to be learned from the recent Russian-Georgian war. First, Western security commitments should not to be made unless they can be enforced; and second, autonomous ethnic regions within tiny nations that border powerful states carry the potential for future conflicts.
The Russian-Georgian war was the by-product of a poorly thought out American foreign policy in the Caucasus because it attempted to gain American influence against Russia without providing sufficient American power to sustain that policy when challenged by Russia. This does not excuse the brutal application of Russian power against a tiny neighboring state, but it goes a long way in explaining why America responded as it did, and why American foreign policy in the Caucasus has proven to be without substance.
During the war, President Bush proclaimed America’s "unwavering support" for the former Soviet republic of Georgia. For the U.S. however, it was just another hollow gesture that reinforced an unfortunate pattern of American hubris. Bush lauded the Rose Revolution that swept Mikheil Saakashvili to power, backed Georgia's bid to enter NATO, and traveled to Tbilisi in 2005 to give his "pledge to the Georgian people that you've got a solid friend in America". In response, the Georgians aligned themselves with the U.S., sent 2,000 troops to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan beside American forces, and even named a main road in Tbilisi after Bush. At the White House last March, Saakashvili expressed his gratitude to the president for having "really put Georgia firmly on the world's freedom map."
Nevertheless, when push came to shove, the American response to the Russian invasion of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was all rhetoric in large measure because the U.S. was already over-extended in Iraq and Afghanistan and had neither the power, the strategic necessity nor the political capital to take on the Russians over Georgia – and the Russians knew it. The weak U.S. response to the Russian invasion has not only diminished U.S. standing in the region, but arguably as a world power as well. As a friend and ally, Georgia was abandoned to the mercies of the Russian war machine and the other former Soviet republics have no doubt taken note of this.
In many ways, the war was inevitable. Post-World War II Western strategy toward the Soviet Union and its satellites was shaped by George Kennan’s 1947 Cold War doctrine of “containment”. For decades, the U.S. alliances that encircled the Soviet bloc sent a clear message to Stalin and his successors: “Not one more inch!” With the fall of the Soviet Union, that policy was extended under the Clinton and Bush administrations to the former Soviet republics but was propelled by the idea of promoting democratic change and stability in the newly-freed countries that border Russia. While the Russians continually questioned Western motives for this expansion, there was little they could do about it. Over the last few years, however, a newly empowered and resurgent oligarchy under Russian nationalist Prime Minister Vladimir Putin began to see these American overtures as an existential threat. Russia: The New Order Cometh >>> By Mark Silverberg | August 29, 2008
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