Iran
YNET NEWS: The fact that Iran stands today able to challenge or even defy the United States in every sphere of American influence in the Middle East attests to the dismal failure of the Bush administration’s policy toward it during the last six years. Feeling emboldened and unrestrained, Tehran may, however, miscalculate the consequences of its own actions, which could precipitate a catastrophic regional war. The Bush administration has less than a year to rein in Iran’s reckless behavior if it hopes to prevent such an ominous outcome and achieve, at least, a modicum of regional stability.

By all assessments, Iran has reaped the greatest benefits from the Iraq war. The war’s consequences and the American preoccupation with it have provided Iran with an historic opportunity to establish Shiite dominance in the region while aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapons program to deter any challenge to its strategy. Tehran is fully cognizant that the successful pursuit of its regional hegemony has now become intertwined with the clout that a nuclear program bestows. Therefore, it is most unlikely that Iran will give up its nuclear ambitions at this juncture, unless it concludes that the price will be too high to bear. That is, whereas before the Iraq war Washington could deal with Iran’s nuclear program by itself, now the Bush administration must also disabuse Iran of the belief that it can achieve its regional objectives with impunity.

Thus, while the administration attempts to stem the Sunni-Shiite violence in Iraq to prevent it from engulfing other states in the region, Washington must also take a clear stand in Lebanon. Under no circumstances should Iranian-backed Hizbullah be allowed to topple the secular Lebanese government. If this were to occur, it would trigger not only a devastating civil war in Lebanon but a wider Sunni-Shiite bloody conflict. The Arab Sunni states, and especially Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan are terrified of this possible outcome. For them Lebanon may well provide the litmus test of the administration’s resolve to inhibit Tehran’s adventurism but they must be prepared to directly support US efforts.

In this regard, the Bush administration must wean Syria from Iran. This move is of paramount importance because not only could Syria end its political and logistical support for Hizbullah, but it could return Syria, which is predominantly Sunni, to the Arab-Sunni fold. Mr. Bush must realize that Damascus’s strategic interests are not compatible with Tehran’s and that the Assad regime knows only too well its future political stability and economic prosperity depends on peace with Israel and normal relations with the United States.

President Assad may talk tough and embrace militancy as a policy tool, yet he is the same president who called, more than once, for unconditional resumption of peace negotiations with Israel and was rebuffed. The stakes for the United States and its allies in the region are too high to preclude testing Syria’s real intentions, which can be ascertained only through direct talks. It is high time for the Administration to reassess its policy toward Syria and begin by abandoning its schemes of regime change in Damascus. Syria simply matters; the Administration must end its efforts to marginalize a country that can play such a pivotal role in changing the political dynamics for the better throughout the region. Ending Iran’s Defiance by Alon Ben-Meir

Mark Alexander